Why are the Houthis entering the war? Why now?
It seemed clear from the outset of the Middle East war that the Houthis were never resolved to stay out of the fight; rather, their delayed entry reflected a calculated decision taken in coordination with Tehran. The question, as the Houthis themselves framed it, was not whether to join the fray, but when.
Iran has aimed to stretch out a war of attrition with its enemies, making the battlefield ever wider, and using its assets incrementally as the confrontation unfolds. For some time, it appears, the Houthis believed that Iran’s strategy – attacking Israel, U.S. assets and Gulf oil and gas facilities, as well as blocking the Strait of Hormuz – was sufficient. Their own media narratives portrayed Iran as capable of winning the war. So long as Iran was holding the upper hand, why join the fight? Yet the Houthis always said they might enter the battle themselves, even without an explicit request from Tehran, if they perceived a meaningful deterioration in Iran’s position.
Now, with U.S.-Israeli military pressure on Iran intensifying, they appear to have judged the moment ripe to step in. On the morning of 28 March, they launched a missile at Israel, crossing the threshold from declared readiness to active belligerency. They pledged to continue firing until what they called “U.S. and Israeli aggression” against Iran and other axis groups ends.
The timing of their entry suggests two things. First, they may be seeking to bolster Iran’s negotiating position, amid growing talk of possible U.S.-Iran dialogue about ending the war. By opening another front, the Houthis increase pressure on Washington and its allies, signalling that if the U.S. and Israel do not halt their military campaign, its cost will keep rising. Secondly, they may be responding to mounting threats to Iran, including talk of U.S. marines occupying Iranian islands, other possible ground operations to try opening the Strait of Hormuz and the prospect of Gulf Arab states joining the confrontation. The Houthis have foreshadowed such thinking in various pronouncements since the war began. Late in the evening of 27 March, just hours before they fired at Israel, the Houthis released a self-described “important statement” setting out the conditions that would make them intervene: if other countries joined the U.S. and Israel in fighting Iran; if attacks on Iran or “another Muslim country” were launched from the Red Sea; or if the U.S. and Israel escalated the war.
The Houthis’ choice of target is telling. By attacking Israel and, so far, no one else, they are telegraphing their capability while avoiding an immediate breach of an understanding they reached with Washington about the Red Sea. During most of the Gaza war from late 2023 to 2025, the Houthis were firing at shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab, the strait linking the sea to the Gulf of Aden, in solidarity with Hamas and the Palestinians. In January 2024, with President Joe Biden in office, the U.S. launched a bombing campaign in Yemen intended to stop those attacks and secure those vital shipping lanes. In March 2025, with the Houthis still harrying warships and merchant vessels with missiles and drones, the Trump administration escalated with a tougher 55-day bombardment. That May, the two sides made a deal whereby the U.S. would stand down and the Houthis would cease firing at the U.S. navy and commercial maritime traffic. These terms notably said nothing about Israel.
The Red Sea remains a latent pressure point. As demonstrated during the Gaza war, the Houthis can disrupt navigation in the sea and the Bab al-Mandab, with implications for global trade, particularly in oil and gas, that are even more severe with the Strait of Hormuz mostly shut. Iran has also made this broader maritime threat explicit. What had been touted as a deterrent is now brandished as a weapon.
